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SHOW HER THE MONEY: THE CALIFORNIA
COURT OF APPEAL'S MISTAKE CONCERNING
IN RE MARRIAGE OF BONDS
I. INTRODUCTION
Most people can only dream of accumulating the millions of dollars
professional athletes earn each year.' Even those professional athletes who
make less than their leagues' average are greatly compensated because of
minimum salary floors. These salaries continue to increase dramatically.
Similarly, the divorce rate among professional athletes has increased.4
Although the general population's divorce rate in the United States is a
1. See Lois Caliri, Cox Communications' Cable Clients in Roanoke, Va., Area See Rate
Increases, ROANOKE TIMES, Mar. 29, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group
File, Most Recent Two Years (stating the average salary of a football player in the National
Football League ("NFL") was $1.39 million in 1997); see also Tim Kawakami, Fox Agrees to
Six-Year Deal, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1999, at D8 (mentioning the average salary of a basketball
player in the National Basketball Association (NBA) is between $3.03 million (NBA figure) and
$3.27 million (player's union figure)); New Kagan Report on Hockey Business Highlights
Coming Face-Off in League/Player Salary, Revenue Dispute, Bus. Wire, Aug. 26, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years [hereinafter New
Kagan Report]; David Williams, Interest Wanes for Pro Fans, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, TN),
Sept. 30, 1999, at DI, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, Most Recent Two
Years (noting the average salary of a Major League Baseball ("MLB") player was $1.7 million in
1999).
2. See Shav Glick, At Least They're Keeping a Roof Over Their Heads, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
27, 1999, at D2. The minimum salary of a veteran football player in the NFL is $400,000. See
id.
3. See John K. Harris, Jr., Essentials of Estate Planning for the Professional Athlete, 11 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 159, 161 (1993) (noting professional athletes are experiencing
increases in compensation and paid endorsements); New Kagan Report, supra note 1 (finding
from 1992 to 1999 average salaries increased 157% in hockey (NHL), 125% in basketball (NBA),
53% in football (NFL), and 23% in baseball (MLB)); Jimmy Smith, Empty Seats Send Fans'
Message Loud and Clear, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 23, 1999, at C2, available in
LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years (showing professional athletes'
salaries have increased 30% in the last three years).
4. See Harris, supra note 3, at 161 (noting an increase in the number of second and third
marriages for professional athletes).
458 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:457
startling fifty percent,5 there appears to be an even greater likelihood of
divorce among retired professional athletes.6
Given professional athletes' increasing salaries, and their likelihood
of divorce, prenuptial agreements are very attractive options for them.7
Additionally, some athletes fear that potential mates are merely marrying
them for their money.8 Thus, it is understandable why professional athletes
feel the need to protect their assets with prenuptial agreements defining
what constitutes their own separate property. 9 These agreements provide a
means of avoiding the default rule in community property jurisdictions' °
that all marital property is divided equally upon divorce."
In light of the benefits of prenuptial agreements, it is easier to
understand why Barry Bonds, a professional baseball player for the San
5. See Richard Hoffner, Scorecard. Divorce, American League Style, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 17, 1998, at 17.
6. Although there is almost no data on the divorce rates of retired athletes, the athletes
themselves seem to think divorce among their ranks is a far more prevalent problem than in the
general population. See Lori Rotenberk, Making the Family a Team, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 15,
1998, at 44, available in 1998 WL 5572261. Mike Singletary, a retired professional football
player, noted he believes the divorce rate among retired professional athletes is approximately
86%. See id. Reggie White, a retired professional football player, attributes the high divorce rate
among retired professional athletes to the fact they do not have a purpose after finishing their
careers. See Packers' White Picked NFL's Defensive MVP, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Jan. 7, 1999, at 3D, available in 1999 WL 4386357.
7. A prenuptial agreement can be referred to as an antenuptial agreement, antenuptial
contract, premarital contract, premarital agreement or a marital settlement. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1200 (7th ed. 1999). A prenuptial agreement is defined as "[a]n agreement made
before marriage usu[ally] to resolve issues of... property division if the marriage ends in divorce
or by the death of the spouse." Id. Hereinafter, antenuptial or premarital agreements will be
referred to as prenuptial agreements.
Chicago lawyer Marshall Auerbach recommends prenuptial agreements for people that tend
to have "income explosions," including many professional athletes, and those who have gone
through messy divorces. Barbara Kleban Mills, In a Big Bucks Divorce, Lawyer Marshall
Auerbach Tells How to WalkAway with the Spoils, PEOPLE WKLY., Mar. 3, 1986, at 106, 108.
8. See, e.g., Bruce Newman, The Very Model of a Modem Marriage, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
Aug. 4, 1986, at 34, 38. Nancy Lopez, a professional golfer explains when she married her first
husband, a sportscaster, she feared he was marrying her for her money. See id. She later
divorced him and married a successful baseball player, Ray Knight. See id. at 34, 38. Lopez says
when she married Knight, she did not have this same fear because he had his own money. See id.
at 38.
9. See Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements,
49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 890 (1997).
10. See Blaine D. Beckstead, Comment, Understanding and Applying I.R.C. §66, 33 IDAHO
L. REv. 567, 578-79 n.97 (1997) (citing a number of statutes supporting this proposition).
11. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 1994); Susan Westerberg Prager, The Persistence
of Separate Property Concepts in California's Community Property System, 1849-1975, 24
UCLA L. REv. 1, 6 (1976) (describing the community property system).
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Francisco Giants, executed a prenuptial agreement. 12  Seven years after
Barry Bonds and his prospective wife signed a prenuptial agreement, the
marriage broke down.13 The validity of the couple's prenuptial agreement
became an important issue in their divorce. The trial court upheld the
agreement, 14 but the California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's
decision. 5 Barry Bonds appealed, and now awaits the California Supreme
Court's decision.
16
This Note discusses the California Court of Appeal's refusal to
uphold Barry Bonds' prenuptial agreement in In re Marriage of Bonds.1 7 It
argues the appellate court discounted the agreement's choice-of-law clause
for the wrong reasons, but correctly applied California law. Further, this
Note explains how the appellate court's desire to save Bonds' wife from
the prenuptial agreement resulted in a departure from California law.
Specifically, the court improperly created a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny for prenuptial agreements. Part II explores prenuptial agreement
law, the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act ("UPAA") and California's
approaches to choice of law issues. Part III discusses In re Marriage of
Bonds. Part IV analyzes whether the court was correct in discounting the
choice-of-law clause, in applying California law to the case and in applying
a strict level of scrutiny to determine whether the agreement was signed
voluntarily. Part V proposes legislatures should require both parties
entering into a prenuptial agreement to have independent legal counsel.
Finally, Part VI concludes although the choice-of-law clause in the Bonds'
prenuptial agreement was improperly dismissed, the correct law was
applied. The court should not have required independent legal counsel
because heightened scrutiny of the prenuptial agreement was an improper
level of review.
12. See Greg Mitchell, Ballplayer's Prenup Strikes Out in Court Because Wife Had No
Lawyer, Agreement Requires 'Strict Scrutiny,' LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 14, 1999, at 4,
available in WESTLAW, 4/14/1999 TLI 4.
13. See Bonds v. Bonds (In re Marriage of Bonds), 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 787-89 (Ct. App.
1999), cert. granted, 981 P.2d 40 (Cal. 1999).
14. See Bonds v. Bonds (In re Marriage of Bonds), No. 019162, slip op. 2194, 2194 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Mateo County July 20, 1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review), rev'd, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App. 1999), cert. granted, 981 P.2d
40 (Cal. 1999).
15. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787.
16. See Bonds v. Bonds (In re Marriage of Bonds), 981 P.2d 40 (Cal. 1999) (granting
certiorari).
17. 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Ct. App. 1999).
2000]
460 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WREVIEW [Vol. 20:457
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
A. California's Community Property Scheme
California's marital property laws are based on a community property
system.' 8  Under this system, all property acquired by a spouse before
marriage and all property given or devised to that spouse during the
marriage are considered that spouse's separate property. 19 The spouse who
acquired this separate property has the sole power to manage and control it
during the marriage and accordingly upon divorce.20
By contrast, any property acquired or earned by a spouse during the
marriage is considered community property.21 This includes earnings
received by a spouse during the marriage.22 During the term of the
marriage, both spouses have joint management power over all community
property and either spouse can dispose of such property without the consent
of the other spouse.23 Upon divorce, each spouse receives one-half of the
community property.24 In the event one of the spouses dies, the surviving
spouse and the decedent's estate each generally receives one-half of the
25community property.
The community property system views marriage as a community to
which each spouse contributes, 26 regardless of the actual division of labor
18. See GAIL BOREMAN BIRD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 5 (6th ed. 1994). California's community property scheme is based on the Spanish
civil law system of dividing property into separate and community property. See Prager, supra
note 11, at 6.
19. See Prager, supra note 11, at 6; CAL. FAM. CODE § 770 (West 1994) (defining separate
property in California).
20. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 752 (West 1994). "[N]either husband nor wife has any interest
in the separate property of the other." Id. By means of inference, any separate property acquired
during the marriage is the property of that spouse, which includes the right to control and manage
the property. See Prager, supra note 11, at 7.
21. See Prager, supra note 11, at 6; CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 1994) (defining
community property in California).
22. See Wilson v. Wilson (In re Marriage of Wilson), 518 P.2d 165, 167 (Cal. 1974).
23. See Elizabeth De Armond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control
Provisions of Community Property Law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 237 & n.4 (1994-1995) (noting,
with few restrictions, either spouse can dispose of his or her own one-half interest as well as his
or her spouse's interest).
24. See Prager, supra note 11, at 6 n.28.
25. See GRACE GANz BLUMBERG, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2d ed. 1993).
26. See De Armond, supra note 23, at 249.
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or which spouse earned the property.27 Consequently, each spouse is
28entitled to an equal share in the community property.
In a community property state, any salary earned by an athlete during
the marriage is considered community property.29 The community property
system, with very few restrictions, also provides the non-athlete spouse
with equal management power over these earnings. 30 This system serves to
reward contributions of non-athlete spouses, such as managing the
household and caring for the children.
31
The other property scheme in the U.S. is the modem common law
system of separate property.32 In contrast to community property, common
law deems the property acquired or earned by one spouse during the
marriage as the separate property of that spouse unless the couple agrees to
jointly own the property.33 The most significant difference between the
two systems becomes apparent at divorce. 34  Unlike the community
property system, which divides community property equally between the
spouses at divorce, the common law system divides the marital and
separate property based on principles of equity.35 However, many common
law jurisdictions are moving toward adopting the fifty-fifty distribution
system of community property schemes.
36
B. Prenuptial Agreements:
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act versus Common Law
Although California presumes all property bought or earned during
the marriage is community property,37 prenuptial agreements can alter the
rights of prospective spouses.38 The prenuptial agreement is a vehicle for
27. See Prager, supra note 11, at 6.
28. See De Armond, supra note 23, at 249.
29. See Wilson, 518 P.2d at 167 (noting money earned by a spouse during the marriage is
community property).
30. See De Armond, supra note 23, at 237.
31. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
32. See Leslie Fields, Alabama's Elective Share: It's Time to Adopt the Partnership Theory
of Marriage, 46 ALA. L. REV. 797, 797 (1995).
33. See BLUMBERG, supra note 25, at 6 (noting common ownership in a common law
jurisdiction is possible only by explicit choice).
34. See id. at 7.
35. See id. at 4-5.
36. See id. at 5.
37. See Prager, supra note 11, at 6; CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (defining what constitutes
community property).
38. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1500 (West 1994).
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transmuting separate property into community property and vice-versa.39
In effect, prospective spouses can opt out of the community property
scheme.4°
1. Common Law Treatment of Prenuptial Agreements
Before the enactment of the UPAA,4' most states had little statutory
guidance concerning prenuptial agreements.42 Parties entering into such
contracts had to rely on the common law.43 As a result, the body of
common law that developed lacked uniformity. 44 Common law remains
the source of law relating to prenuptial agreements for those states that
have not adopted the UPAA. 45  However, the common law creates an
important framework for understanding the workings and goals of the
UPAA.
Under California's pre-UPAA common law, prenuptial agreements
were held valid and enforceable as long as they met certain criteria.46 In
the seminal case, In re Marriage of Dawley,4 7 the California Supreme
39. See Gejeian v. Dokoozlian (In re Estate of Dokoozlian), 33 Cal. Rptr. 151, 154 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1963) ("[A]n executed... agreement may be used to change the status of property from that
of separate to community .... (citing Cummins v. Cummins (In re Estate of Cummins), 280
P.2d 128, 133 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955))); Leasefirst v. Borrelli, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 115 (App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1993) ("[A] married person[] may by agreement .. . [t]ransmute community
property [into] separate property ...." (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 850 (West 1994) (original
version at CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110.710))).
40. See Beckstead, supra note 10, at 578-79 n.97 (mentioning parties can use prenuptial
agreements or contracts during the marriage to "opt out" of a community property system).
41. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
42. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns about the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127, 136 (1993).
43. See id.
44. See Laura P. Graham, Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Modern
Social Policy: The Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Regulating the Ongoing Marriage,
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1993); Atwood, supra note 42, at 137-38 (noting that
states emphasize different aspects of procedural fairness and take different approaches relating to
substantive fairness for prenuptial agreements).
45. See Atwood, supra note 42, at 136.
46. See John G. Branca & Marc I. Steinberg, Antenuptial Agreements Under California
Law: An Examination of the Current Law and In re Marriage of Dawley, 11 U.S.F. L. REv. 317,
328-29 (1977) (citing circumstances in which a prenuptial agreement may not be enforceable).
The first apparent case in California in which a prenuptial agreement disposing of assets
upon divorce was held to be valid was Barker v. Barker, 293 P.2d 85 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
In Barker, a prenuptial agreement stipulated certain real and personal property would remain the
separate property of each spouse. See id. at 88. The court held the prenuptial contract was
enforceable because it did not relieve the parties of their marital obligations by limiting spousal
support, child support, or alimony. See id. at 90.
47. Dawley v. Dawley (In re Marriage of Dawley), 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976).
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Court defined which prenuptial agreement terms violated public policy and
were not the proper subject of such agreements.48 The court held that
prenuptial agreements were not void merely because the parties
contemplated divorce.49  Rather, the court only invalidated those
agreements whose terms objectively promoted divorce. 50 Thus, the court
ruled prenuptial agreements classifying prospective spouses' earnings
while married as separate property were not against public policy. 51 The
court went on to enumerate several terms which it viewed as promoting
divorce: any waiver or reduction of spousal support rights 2 or child
support;53 any lump sum settlement of all rights in the event of divorce; 54 or
any attempt to limit costs and attorneys' fees arising out of divorce.55 In
short, Dawley significantly restricted the public policy exception to the
enforcement of prenuptial agreements in California. Although California
currently prescribes to the UPAA, those states that continue to rely on the
common law adhere to some of the same public policy exceptions as
California's pre-UPAA common law.56
2. The Common Law's Substantive and Procedural Requirements for
Prenuptial Agreements
Under the common law, prenuptial agreements must satisfy the same
basic requirements as any other contract: the agreement must have been
formed by a valid offer, acceptance and consideration.57 However, in
addition to the basic contract requirements, a prenuptial agreement must be
substantively fair and meet the procedural standards of fair dealing.
58
48. See generally'id.
49. See id. at 325.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 328-29.
53. See Dawley, 551 P.2d at 328 & n.5; Branca & Steinberg, supra note 46, at 338.
54. See Dawley, 551 P.2d at 329; Pereira v. Pereira, 103 P. 488, 489 (Cal. 1909) (holding a
term providing for a lump sum settlement of all rights in the event of a divorce is void as against
public policy).
55. See Dawley, 551 P.2d at 330; Whiting v. Whiting, 216 P. 92, 95 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1923) (holding a term limiting costs and attorneys' fees one spouse could be forced to pay the
other spouse by a court in case of a divorce is void as against public policy).
56. See Homer H. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 COLO. L. REv. 141, 148 (1979) (noting
prenuptial agreements that fix maintenance or alimony are invalid).
57. See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 46, at 327.
58. See id. at 330. For instance, courts might find there is a lack of consideration when one
spouse "relinquishes valuable rights for little in return." Id. Before Arizona adopted the UPAA,
the state relied on the substantive and procedural requirements of the common law for enforcing a
prenuptial agreement. See Hess v. Hess (In re Marriage of Hess), No. 1 CA-CV 91-0233, 1 CA-
2000]
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Fair dealing requires the parties fully disclose all assets.59 It also
requires the couple knowingly and voluntarily enter into the agreement free
from undue influence, coercion and fraud. ° In determining whether an
agreement was executed voluntarily, a court will also consider timing, the
non-drafting spouse's knowledge of the underlying legal rights, knowledge
and understanding of the terms of the agreement, and availability of
independent legal advice to the non-drafting spouse.6'
The absence of independent legal advice does not automatically imply
a prenuptial agreement is tainted by fraud or undue influence. 62 Instead,
courts have held the availability of independent legal counsel is only one
factor in determining the validity of a prenuptial agreement.63 No state has
gone so far as to require independent legal counsel for the enforcement of
prenuptial agreements. 64
In addition to procedural fairness, an agreement has to be
substantively fair when the couple executes the agreement and at the time
of the divorce. 65 In determining whether an agreement is substantively fair,
courts consider a number of factors, including:
(1) the financial situation of each party; (2) their respective ages;
(3) their respective property; (4) their family ties and
connections; (5) all of the circumstances leading to the
execution of the agreement; (6) their marriage altogether; (7)
their actions after the marriage as tending to show whether the
agreement was understandingly made; and (8) the [non-drafting
spouse's] needs.66
CV 92-0185, 1993 Ariz. App. LEXIS 244, at *13-14, *17, *21 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1993).
Arizona also placed the burden of proof on the proponent of the agreement. See id. at *13.
59. See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 46, at 330.
60. See id. "Knowingly" connotes an individual acting willfully with awareness of the
nature of his or her conduct. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (7th ed. 1999). As a result,
coercion defeats the voluntariness requirement of fair dealing because it involves compelling a
person to do something by force. See id. at 252. Similarly, fraud, an intentional
misrepresentation of the truth, also invalidates a prenuptial agreement because the innocent party
signing the agreement lacks full awareness of the consequences. See id. at 670.
61. See Elizabeth Barker Brandt, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and the Reality of
PremaritalAgreements in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 539, 547-48 (1997).
62. See Sayegh v. Sayegh (In re Sayegh's Estate), 257 P.2d 995, 998 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1953).
63. See id.
64. See Marston, supra note 9, at 913.
65. See Branca & Steinberg, supra note 46, at 331-32; Clark, supra note 56, at 151.
66. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 46, at 331 n.67 (quoting 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90(7)(A), at 294 (Supp. 1975)).
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However, the substantive prong has little weight on its own.6 7 It is merely
another method of determining whether the waiver of property rights was
made knowingly and intelligently, and was free from undue influence.
68
C. The Impact of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act on Prenuptial
Agreements
The sexual revolution of the 1970's triggered an explosive increase in
prenuptial agreements during the 1980's.69 The increase of post-divorce
remarriages resulting from the cultural shifts of the 1970's prompted more
couples to enter into prenuptial agreements in order to plan their economic
futures more carefully. 70 The lack of uniformity in states' treatment of
prenuptial agreements led the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to promulgate the UPAA in 1983.71 On January 1,
1986, California's version of the UPAA went into effect.72
The UPAA requirements for enforcement of prenuptial agreements
are as follows:
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against
whom enforcement is sought proves that: (1) that party did not
execute the agreement voluntarily; or (2) the agreement was
unconscionable when it was executed and, before the execution
of the agreement, that party: (i) was not provided a fair and
reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of
the other party; (ii) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in
writing, any right to disclosure of the other property beyond the
disclosure provided; and (iii) did not have, or reasonably could
not have had, an adequate knowledge of the property or
financial obligations of the other party.73
The burden of proof rests on the challenger of the prenuptial agreement to
prove the agreement is unenforceable.74
67. See id. at 333.
68. See id.
69. See Marston, supra note 9, at 891. Between 1978 and 1988, it is estimated that the
number of prenuptial agreements had tripled. See id.
70. See id. at 891 & n.25.
71. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 369; see also Graham, supra note
44, at 1049.
72. See Atwood, supra note 42, at 127 n.4. Twenty-six states have adopted the UPAA. See
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted,
9B U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 1999).
73. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
74. See id.
20001
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The UPAA sought to bring certainty to prenuptial agreements by
standardizing their validity requirements and treating them like ordinary
contracts.7 However, the UPAA is greatly criticized because it does not
invalidate grossly unconscionable 76 prenuptial agreements if the parties
fully disclosed all of their assets prior to signing the agreement. 7 Under
the UPAA, occurrences not envisioned at the time of contracting could
tender a prenuptial agreement grossly unfair at divorce, but the agreement
would nonetheless be enforced as long as the parties fully disclosed all of
their assets.78
The UPAA also permits parties to challenge agreements that are
entered into involuntarily.79 However, the drafters cite only one case,
80,8Lutgert v. Lutgert, to explain the term "voluntary.' In Lutgert, a bride
was presented with a prenuptial agreement for the first time just hours
before the marriage.82 The court ruled the bride entered into the agreement
involuntarily, reasoning the bride was pressured into signing the
agreement. 83 The comments to the UPAA indicate the drafters intended to
broadly interpret involuntariness." However, parties currently have to rely
on common law cases regarding voluntariness because there are almost no
cases interpreting the term under the UPAA. 85
75. See Graham, supra note 44, at 1050; Marston, supra note 9, at 899.
76. The doctrine of unconscionability allows a court to deny enforcement of substantively
unreasonable contracts or contract terms. See 1 WITKIN SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § 33
(9th ed. 1987). These contracts generally involve overly harsh terms or one-sided contracts. See
id.
77. See Marston, supra note 9, at 899.
78. See Atwood, supra note 42, at 146-47.
79. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987); see also
Atwood, supra note 42, at 128. Like the common law rules, the UPAA proscribes fraud and
duress in the execution of prenuptial agreements. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see
also Brandt, supra note 61, at 546. The UPAA does not specifically prohibit fraud and duress,
but does so implicitly. See Brandt, supra note 61, at 546; UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT §
6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987). It requires fair and reasonable disclosure of all property and
financial obligations, and requires that the agreement be signed voluntarily. See Brandt, supra
note 61, at 546.
80. 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
81. See UNIF. PREMARrTAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987) (citing
Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)); see also Brandt, supra note
61, at 546.
82. See Lutgert, 338 So. 2d at 1114. Although the idea of a prenuptial agreement had been
mentioned on previous occasions, the bride contended she had objected to the idea every time.
See id.
83. See id. at 1117.
84. See Brandt, supra note 61, at 546.
85. The UPAA comments state that section 6(a) is intended to be comparable to the
statutory or common law requirements of many jurisdictions. See UNIF. PREMARrrAL
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An important difference between common law and the UPAA is
common law requires prenuptial agreements to be fair and equitable,86
while the UPAA only protects against unconscionability.87 The two
concepts differ because unconscionability requires extreme unfairness.
88
However, even where unconscionability exists, a spouse nonetheless
receives little protection under the UPAA, because in order to invalidate a
prenuptial agreement on grounds of unconscionability, there must also be a
failure to disclose all assets. 89
The UPAA also differs from the common law because it places the
burden of proof on the person challenging the prenuptial agreement's
validity, whereas some common law states place the burden of proof on the
person arguing in favor of the agreement.90 Consequently, the UPAA treats
prenuptual agreements more favorably.9'
D. Choice-of-Law Clauses and the Use of Conflict of Laws Rules in the
Absence of Such Clauses
A choice-of-law clause allows contracting parties to select a particular
state's laws to apply should a dispute arise.92 Choice-of-law clauses in
prenuptial agreements are specifically used to predict and control the
outcome of possible litigation arising from contractual disputes involving
materially different laws of multiple states.
93
AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987). Consequently, it is reasonable to rely on the
common law factors to help understand the UPAA's requirements.
86. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
87. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987); In re
Marriage of Hess, No. 1 CA-CV 91-0233, 1 CA-CV 92-0185, 1993 Ariz. App. LEXIS 244, at
*13, *17, *21 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1993).
88. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2)(i), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
90. Compare UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6, 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987) (noting the
person challenging the prenuptial agreement has the burden of proof), with Spector v. Spector,
531 P.2d 176, 185 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) (showing Arizona's pre-UPAA common law placed the
burden of proof on the person desiring enforcement of the prenuptial agreement).
91. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
92. See Joan F. Kessler, Can you Choose the Law to Govern Your Marital Agreement?, 8 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 107, 108 (1992).
93. See Richard J. Bauerfeld, Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract
Conflicts of Law: Party Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1659, 1659
(1982); Mark J. Kelson, Choice-of-Law, Venue, and Consent-to-Jurisdiction Provisions in
California Commercial Lending Agreements: Can Good Draftsmanship Overcome Bad Choice-
of-Law Doctrine?, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1337, 1337 (1990).
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Choice-of-law clauses are particularly important for professional
athletes because they travel extensively94 and do not always live in the state
in which their teams are based.95 An athlete can conceivably spend more
than half of his or her time in a state different from that of his or her
spouse. 96  That state's prenuptial agreement laws may be substantially
different from the laws of the state in which an athlete's spouse resides.
97
Thus, the question of which state's laws should apply to an athlete's
prenuptial agreement can be a significant issue.
98
However, athletes can avoid this uncertainty by including choice-of-
law clauses in their contracts. 99 Choosing a particular state's laws to
govern a prenuptial agreement is a convenient way to avoid dispute over
that issue and perhaps to avoid litigation altogether. °° For instance, an
athlete may choose a UPAA state to govern because the UPAA favors the
enforceability of prenuptial agreements.'01
Whenever a choice-of-law clause is incomplete or ambiguous, a court
generally looks to traditional contract interpretation principles to give effect
to the mutual intentions of the contracting parties. 102 A court may also use
extrinsic evidence to determine the intended meaning of an ambiguous
choice of law term. 10 3 If this fails, contract principles call for the court to
94. See Jeffrey L. Krasney, State Income Taxation of Nonresident Professional Athletes, 2
SPORTS L.J. 127, 128 n.2 (1995). Professional athletes, such as, baseball, basketball, football and
hockey players will spend approximately half of their seasons in their teams' state and the other
half traveling to other states. See id. These seasons generally last about six months out of the
year. See id. With pre-season and post-season travel, professional athletes can travel up to seven
and one-half months in any given year. See id.
95. See id. at 130. Many professional athletes file tax returns in two states: the state in
which the athlete resides or is domiciled and the state in which the athlete plays home games. See
id.
96. Because athletes may spend up to seven and one-half months out of the year traveling, it
follows they spend less than half a year at home. See id. at 128 n.2.
97. See Murphy v. Murphy, No. FA 970156433S, 1998 WL 262805, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
May 11, 1998) (involving a dispute between non-athlete spouses domiciled in different states);
see also Elgar v. Elgar, 679 A.2d 937, 940 (Conn. 1996).
98. See Kelson, supra note 93, at 1337.
99. Because lending contracts involving different states can lead to conflict of laws
problems, choice-of-law clauses are often used to bring more certainty to these contracts. See id.
The same holds true for prenuptial agreements.
100. See Bauerfeld, supra note 93, at 1669 & n.58.
101. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
102. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1636 (West 1985).
103. See Powers v. Dickson, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 266 (Ct. App. 1997). Under the rules of
parol evidence, extrinsic evidence can be used to explain ambiguous contract terms as long as the
evidence does not contradict the language in the contract. See id.
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interpret the clause against the party who drafted the contract.1' 4  For
example, if the drafter of an ambiguous choice-of-law clause intended for
Idaho's laws to apply to the contract, while the other party desired
application of Alaska law, the ambiguous clause would be interpreted
against the drafter. Thus, the court would apply Alaska law.
California courts generally look to the Second Restatement on
Conflict of Laws105 for guidance when determining whether a valid choice-
of-law clause in a prenuptial agreement should be upheld.'06  The
Restatement provides:
The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied, even if the
particular issue is one in which the parties could not have
resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
the issue, unless either (a) the chosen state has no substantial
relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other
reasonable basis for the parties [sic] choice, or (b) application of
the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue and
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties.
10 7
Although the Restatement suggests choice-of-law clauses will
generally be upheld, its public policy exception gives courts the flexibility
to invalidate such clauses.'0 8  This is because the Restatement provides
little guidance as to what constitutes a fundamental public policy.' °9 In
addition, the Restatement directs courts to give states' interests and general
regulatory powers deference."0  Thus, the Restatement's fundamental
public policy exception makes the validity of choice-of-law clauses
uncertain in California."'1
104. See id. at 266-67. Interpreting a contract against the party who drafted the contract is
warranted when the contract is ambiguous and the rules of contract interpretation cannot make it
any more certain. See id.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
106. See Nediloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Cal. 1992).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971).
108. See Kelson, supra note 93, at 1352, 1358.
109. See id. at 1358.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 1358-59.
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When a choice-of-law clause is either absent from a prenuptial
agreement or is deemed invalid, a court looks to conflict of laws principles
to determine which state's law applies.' 12 In California, courts use the
comparative impairment approach to resolve conflict of laws issues."
3
Under the comparative impairment approach, the forum court's laws
are applied unless a party makes a motion to apply a different state's
laws. 14 When such a motion is made, the court must determine if each of
the involved states has an actual policy interest in applying its specific laws
to the case. 115 Where only one state has an actual policy interest, that
state's law will normally be applied. 16 If, on the other hand, both states
have an interest in applying their laws, the court employs the comparative
impairment approach to resolve the conflict." 7
Under the comparative impairment approach, the court categorizes
the conflicting interests as internal and external. " 8 Internal interests are the
objectives underlying a state's laws relating to private dispute resolution." 9
External interests are the state's interests in applying its laws to disputes
between private parties. 1
20
Having distinguished the relevant internal and external interests, the
court must identify which state's internal interests would be impaired the
most in terms of general scope and impact should its laws not be applied. 2'
The court then applies that state's laws to the dispute. 22 The court focuses
on internal interests in this analysis as opposed to the external interests.'
23
112. See Bauerfeld, supra note 93, at 1660, 1662.
113. See Joseph A. Zirkman, Comment, New York's Choice of Law Quagmire Revisited, 51
BROOK. L. REV. 579, 608 (1984).
114. See Holly Sprague, Comment, Choice of Law: A Fond Farewell to Comity and Public
Policy, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1447, 1455 (1986).
115. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719, 721-23 (Cal. 1976).
116. See Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 702 P.2d 570, 582 (Cal. 1985). When only one state has
an interest in applying its laws, the conflict is deemed false, giving rise to the term "false
conflict." See id.
117. See Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 723.
118. See William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17
(1963).
119. See id.
120. See id. External objectives exist when a transaction affects persons from different
states. See id. External interests "are the objectives of each state to make effective, in all
situations involving persons as to whom it has responsibility for legal ordering, that resolution of
contending private interests the state has made for local purposes." Id.
121. See id. at 18.
122. See id. at 17-18.
123. See id. at 17-18.
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III. IN RE MARRIAGE OF BONDS
A. Background and Facts
In 1985, Susann Margreth ("Sun") left her home in Sweden to live
with her father in Montreal, at the age of twenty-one.1 24 In August 1987,
Barry Bonds (Barry) and Sun, both twenty-three years old, met in
Montreal. 125  At the time, Barry played major league baseball for the
Pittsburgh Pirates, earning $106,000 a year.' 26 Sun worked in a restaurant
and attended cosmetology classes with the goal of someday opening her
own business to service celebrities' beauty needs.
27
After spending some time together, Sun moved to Arizona to live
with Barry in November of 1987.128 Shortly thereafter, they decided to get
married, and did so on February 7, 1988, in Las Vegas.129 At Barry's
request, the couple entered into a prenuptial agreement before marrying.
30
Seven years later, the couple sought a divorce,' spurring a legal battle
over the validity of their prenuptial agreement.1
32
Barry claimed he and Sun frequently discussed their desire to keep
their finances separate from each other.' 33 According to Barry, Sun assured
him "she did not want any of his money or to be dependent upon
,,134anyone. Barry maintained he had made it clear Sun would have to sign
a prenuptial agreement prior to their marriage and Sun had agreed to do
so. 35 Barry then retained two attorneys in Arizona, Leonard Brown and
Sabina Megwa, to draft the agreement. 1
36
Barry and Sun prepared lists specifying their respective assets.
37
Brown testified it was his impression both parties wanted an agreement
124. Bonds v. Bonds (In re Marriage of Bonds), 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 787 (Ct. App. 1999),
rev'g No. 019162, slip op. 2194 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo County July 20, 1995) (on file with






130. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788-89.
131. Seeid. at 788.
132. See id. at 789-90.
133. See id. at 787.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 787.
136. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
137. See id.
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waiving their community property rights. 138 Sun was advised by Barry's
attorneys that they only represented Barry and she may 139 want to seek
independent counsel.'40
The prenuptial agreement provided the earnings of each spouse
during the marriage would remain the separate property of that spouse.
14 1
Any property acquired with such earnings would also be the separate
property of that spouse. 142 The day before Barry and Sun's Las Vegas
wedding, the couple-along with a friend of Sun's-met with Barry's
attorneys for a few hours. 14 3 During the meeting, Barry and Sun were
given copies of the premarital agreement for the first time. '44 Although, no
affirmative declarations were made to Sun that she should seek counsel, the
attorneys told "her that 'she may want to [seek independent counsel].""
'145
The attorneys reiterated they only represented Barry.
146
Both parties testified Sun did not want a lawyer at the time of the
signing. 147 Sun felt she did not need legal counsel because she had no
assets and because she believed the attorneys were assisting both her and
Barry. 148 However, Sun also testified she did not understand the nature of
the attorney-client relationship, and thus did not realize the importance of
being represented by her own attorney. 
149
After the parties read the agreement, Megwa explained the agreement
to them line by line. 150 Despite the fact that Sun's native language was
Swedish, Megwa felt Sun fully understood the agreement because she
never indicated she had any trouble understanding English. 151 Megwa
specifically remembered telling the parties the earnings of each spouse






141. See id. at 789.
142. See 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.





148. See 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
149. See id.
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The agreement had numerous errors.' 54 Although both parties signed
the agreement, Brown failed to attest that he was the attorney for Barry.
155
The agreement referred to an attached list of the parties' separate property,
but no list was attached.15 6 Further, the agreement had a choice-of-law
clause, but failed to specify which state's law was to apply. 1 7  Sun
maintained the attorneys told her and Barry that Arizona law would
apply.158 Finally, the agreement also contained a provision relating to child
support, which is void as against public policy in Arizona.
159
After the Bonds married, Sun did not work outside of the house.'
60
The couple had two children together. 16 1 Although Barry and Sun briefly
separated in January 1989, during which time Barry then filed for
divorce, 162 the couple soon reconciled.163 Then, on May 27, 1994, Barry
filed a petition for legal separation in California, the state in which Barry
and Sun then resided.' 64 In response, Sun requested child custody, spousal
support, attorneys' fees and a determination of her property rights. 165 At
the time of the separation proceeding, Barry was earning $8 million a
year. 16
Barry's petition for legal separation was later converted into one for
divorce on December 8, 1994.167 The parties stipulated to bifurcation of
the trial and to the determination of the prenuptial agreement's validity
prior to deciding the issues of child custody, spousal support, attorneys'
fees and the parties' respective property rights.
168
154. See 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788. There were typographical errors, the pages were not
numbered and the parties failed to initial every page despite the agreement's express requirement
that they do so. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 789.
157. See id. at 791.
158. See id.
159. See id. A provision that relates to child support is void against public policy, and thus
illegal. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.






166. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 790.
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B. Superior Court Decision
As a preliminary matter, the trial court held Arizona law applied to
the substantive issues of the Bonds' prenuptial agreement, while California
law applied to the procedural issues. 169 The court, however, neglected to
explain the reasoning behind this holding. 70  The likely reason for the
dichotomy is the choice of law default rules require the laws of the state in
which an agreement is signed-here, Arizona--to apply to the substantive
issues relating to the agreement.' 7' However, courts generally apply the
laws of the state in which the parties reside-here, California--to the
procedural issues of a dispute.
72
As to the substantive issues, the court looked to the following factors:
whether the agreement was free of fraud, coercion or undue influence;
whether Sun entered the agreement with full knowledge of the property
involved, her rights therein and the rights relinquished in executing the
agreement; whether the agreement and its procurement was fair and
equitable; and whether the agreement constituted a contract of adhesion.
73
The court held the agreement and its execution were free from fraud,
coercion and undue influence. 7 4 This holding was based on the following
factual findings: "[Sun] was not forced to [sign] the document;"' 75 she was
not threatened in any way; 76 "[she] never questioned signing the
agreement;"'177 and refusal to sign the agreement would have caused little
169. Bonds v. Bonds (In re Marriage of Bonds), No. 019162, slip op. 2194, 2200 (Cal.
Super. Ct., San Mateo County July 20, 1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Review), rev'd, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783 (Ct. App. 1999), cert. granted, 981
P.2d 40 (Cal. 1999). The procedural issues of the case concern the manner in which the action
proceeds. See BLACK's LAW DICTiONARY 1221 (7th ed. 1999). The substantive issues relate to
the rights and duties of the parties in a dispute. See id. at 1443. Thus, the validity of the
prenuptial agreement was a substantive issue because it defined Barry's and Sun's property
rights. See id.
170. See Bonds, No. 019162, slip op. at 2200.
171. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
172. See id.
173. See generally id. As the applicable Arizona law on antenuptial agreements is exactly
the same as the court applied, it is clear the court applied Arizona law without explicitly saying
so. See Hess v. Hess (In re Marriage of Hess), No. 1 CA-CV 91-0233, 1 CA-CV 92-0185, 1993
Ariz. App. LEXIS 244, at *13-14, *17, *21 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1993) (citing the applicable
Arizona law for prenuptial agreements signed in 1987); Bonds, No. 019162, slip op. at 2196-99.
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embarrassment to her because the wedding was small and could have been
easily postponed.1
78
Additionally, the court held Sun executed the agreement knowingly
and voluntarily, finding she had known about the assets Barry possessed
and had understood his "present and future earnings would remain his
separate property" under the agreement. 179  Although English was not
Sun's native language, the court found her to be intelligent and capable of
understanding the discussions by the attorneys regarding the terms of the
agreement and their potential impact on her and Barry.
1 80
The court also ruled Sun had adequate knowledge of the property
involved in the agreement, her rights in that property "and how the
agreement adversely affected those rights."'181 The court found Barry gave
Sun full disclosure of the nature, approximate value and extent of all of his
assets, and Sun had been afforded sufficient time to read the agreement
prior to executing it.82 Moreover, the court found it persuasive that Sun
never stated she failed to understand the agreement or any explanations
given to her regarding the agreement before signing it.'
83
In addition, as Barry's attorneys had advised her one week before
executing the agreement that she could seek separate counsel, the court
found Sun had adequate and reasonable opportunity to consult with
independent counsel prior to executing the agreement.184 The court noted
during the meeting in which Sun signed the agreement, she declined two
separate suggestions by Barry's attorneys that she may want to retain
separate counsel.'85
Finally, the court ruled the agreement was fair and equitable in terms
of its substance, its execution and its results. 86 The court observed Sun
had very few assets, while Barry had a lucrative future in baseball. 87 Barry
had a right to execute an agreement to protect his present and future
earnings. 188 Sun "received substantial benefit" from signing the agreement
because "[she] lived an opulent lifestyle" during their marriage which she
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. See Bonds, No. 019162, slip op. at 2196.
181. Id. at 2197.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 2197-98.
185. See id.
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otherwise would not have enjoyed. 89 Further, given Barry's income, the
court speculated Sun would probably continue to benefit from child support
for many years. 190 Thus, because the court found nothing in the record
indicating the agreement or its execution was "contrary to good morals and
law,'191 the agreement was deemed fair and equitable.1
92
The trial court held the prenuptial agreement was valid under Arizona
law, and awarded Sun child custody, child support and spousal support.
93
Sun appealed the court's decision to enforce the prenuptial agreement.1
94
C. The California Court of Appeal's Decision
1. Choice of Law
The first issue before the California Court of Appeal was whether the
trial court's choice of law rulings were erroneous.1 95 The court found that a
conflict of laws issue existed because, though the agreement was signed in
Arizona, the parties resided and filed the case in California. 96 Further, the
choice-of-law clause in the Bonds' prenuptial agreement was silent as to
which state law to apply.' 97 Although neither party had challenged the
district court's application of Arizona law, the California Court of Appeal
asked both parties to submit supplemental briefs on the issue.198 Because
Arizona law was more favorable to her, Sun argued Arizona law should
apply, whereas Barry contended California's more prenuptial-friendly law
should apply.'
99
The choice of law issue was critical because it determined which
party had the burden of proof and which test would apply to determine the
validity of the agreement.2° Under California law, Sun would have the
burden of proof as the challenger of the prenuptial agreement. 20 1 However,
189. Id.
190. See id. at 2198-99.
191. Id. at 2198.
192. SeeBonds, No. 019162, slip op. at 2198.
193. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 812.
194. See id. at 790. Sun also appealed the court ordered duration of spousal support. See id.
195. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
196. See id. at 789-90.
197. See id. at 789.
198. See id. at 790.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 790-91.
201. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
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under Arizona law, Barry would bear the burden of proof as the proponent
of the prenuptial agreement.20 2
The choice-of-law clause also played an important role in the validity
of the prenuptial agreement. Before the UPAA was passed, Arizona law
required the agreement be "fair and equitable." 20 3 On the other hand,
California law only required there be full disclosure of all assets prior to
execution of the agreement in order to find the agreement valid. 204 The
procedural requirements for a prenuptial agreement at the time were similar
in both states. California required an agreement be entered into voluntarily,
while Arizona required an agreement be free from fraud, coercion and
undue influence.20 5
The appellate court concluded the trial court should have applied
California law, even if the parties had intended for Arizona law to apply.
206
The court looked to the UPAA to determine whether the choice-of-law
clause was legal in California. 20 7 The relevant provision provided the
parties to a premarital agreement could contract as to choice of law
governing the construction of the agreement.208 The court found the UPAA
drafters clearly distinguished between construction of an agreement on the
one hand, and the validity and enforcement of an agreement on the other.2°
As a result, the court reasoned California's UJPAA did not intend to allow
parties to premarital agreements to contract as to choice of law regarding
enforcement of the agreement.210
The court also held public policy dictated the application of California
law. 2 1 ' The court looked to the prefatory statement written by the UJPAA
drafters, which provided the UPAA's goals were uniformity and certainty
of treatment of premarital agreements. 212 Because Arizona's pre-UPAA
laws would have applied to the Bonds' agreement, the court felt
California's UPAA should have been applied so as not to undermine the
UPAA's goals by applying non-UPAA law.213 Therefore, the court found
202. See id. at 791.
203. Id.
204. See id. at 790-791.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 791.
207. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 791-92.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 792.
212. See id.
213. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791. The prenuptial agreement was signed in 1987, four
years before Arizona enacted a form of the UPAA. See id. at 790.
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the trial court erred in applying Arizona law to determine the validity of the
agreement.
214
2. Validity of the Prenuptial Agreement
a. Unconscionability and Disclosure of Assets
The California Court of Appeal proceeded to analyze the validity of
the prenuptial agreement by applying California's version of the UPAA.215
Pursuant to California Family Code section 1615, a prenuptial agreement
must be entered into voluntarily and must either be free from
unconscionability when executed, or be executed subsequent to a full
disclosure of the spouse's assets.216
In applying the statute to the Bonds case, the court found there was
substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Sun had
adequate knowledge of Barry's property and financial obligations when
signing the agreement.217 Despite the parties' failure to attach property
schedules to the agreement, the court found a handwritten list of the assets,
presented and available during the meeting at the attorneys' office, was
adequate.23 8 Further, the court credited Brown's testimony that he believed
both Barry and Sun were aware of one another's assets. 21 9 Although Sun
complained about the failure to attach the proper schedules, the court noted
Sun's inability to identify any assets or debts Barry had hidden from her.22°
Consequently, the appellate court agreed with the trial court's finding of
adequate disclosure.221 Thus, under California law, once the disclosure
requirement was satisfied, the court had no need to reach the issue of
unconscionability.222
b. Voluntariness
The only remaining issue concerning the validity of the Bonds'
premarital agreement was whether it satisfied the voluntariness requirement
214. See id. at 792.
215. See id. at 798.
216. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (West 1994).





222. See generally CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615.
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of the California UPAA.223  The trial court, applying Arizona law, had
found Sun knowingly and voluntarily signed the agreement. 224 However,
the California Court of Appeal held the trial court failed to properly weigh
Sun's lack of independent legal representation in its voluntariness
determination. 225  Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial
court's holding.226
In deciding how much weight independent legal representation for
both parties should have on the enforceability of a prenuptial agreement,
the court looked to the historical ambivalence toward prenuptial
agreements and how the principles of fundamental fairness played a role in
that history.227 The court concluded the common law requires prenuptial
agreements to be substantively and procedurally fair as a direct result of
this history.228
The court initially looked at how other jurisdictions had dealt with the
"substantive unfairness" analysis. 229 The court criticized other courts'
treatment of prenuptial agreements as ordinary contracts and articulated
several reasons why the agreements merit heightened scrutiny. 23 0 First, the
court noted because women earn less money than men on the whole, they
could be further disadvantaged by waiving their community property
rights.23 1 Second, the court emphasized the special legal status of marriage
connotes a relationship of trust and confidence distinct from that of most
other contracting parties. 232  Additionally, the court acknowledged the
parties' potential lack of understanding of the economic rights being
waived.233 The court determined these findings required closer scrutiny
when examining prenuptial agreements.234 However, the court felt a
heightened substantive fairness review would conflict with the UPAA's
223. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798.
224. Id.
225. See id. at 799, 809.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 794-97.
228. See id.
229. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
230. See id. at 795-96. Ordinary contracts do not generally receive close scrutiny. See id.
231. See id. at 795.
232. See id. at 796. The court felt there was also a strong state interest in closely regulating
prenuptial agreements because they are substantially different from commercial contracts. See id.
Contracts for the "sale of a hundred pounds of... beans" are not quite the same as contracts
regarding marital relationships. Id. (quoting a drafter from an August 3, 1982, proceeding of the
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policy of encouraging the enforceability of prenuptial agreements. 235 As a
result, the court found closer scrutiny of substantive fairness review was
not an appropriate means of protecting parties' interests.236
The court of appeal then analyzed how to implement the heightened
scrutiny review of procedural fairness with regard to prenuptial
agreements. 237 The court found the best way to ensure procedural fairness
in the execution of a prenuptial agreement was for both parties to secure
independent legal counsel.238
The court noted closer scrutiny is applied in the context of postmarital
settlement agreements where the parties did not have equal access to
attorneys. 239 The court was concerned that applying a different standard for
premarital agreements "would contravene California's public policy of
discouraging marital property settlements that violate notions of
fundamental fairness. 24 °  Additionally, the court observed other
jurisdictions apply a heightened scrutiny only where one party to a
prenuptial agreement had legal counsel. 24' Further, the court noted absence
of independent legal counsel is a factor in determining the enforceability of
an agreement under the UPAA.2 42 Finally, the court, citing California legal
235. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 796-97.
238. See id. at 797.
239. See id. at 799. Postmarital agreements are agreements executed by spouses after the
marriage has been entered into in order to specify the division of property in case of divorce or
death. See Graham, supra note 44, at 1038.
240. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 799.
241. See id. at 800. The court cited four cases where strict scrutiny was applied due to one
party's lack of independent legal representation: Lutz v. Schneider (In re Estate of Lutz), 563
N.W.2d 90, 95-101 (N.D. 1997) (noting "lack of adequate legal advice to a prospective spouse to
obtain independent counsel is a significant factual factor in weighing voluntariness of premarital
agreements"); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1346-47 (Ohio 1994) (holding the burden
of proof shifts to the party claiming validity of the agreement where the other party has no
meaningful opportunity to consult with independent counsel and where the agreement provides
disproportionately less property to the underrepresented party); Foran v. Foran (In re Marriage of
Foran), 834 P.2d 1081, 1088 n.10 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding a prenuptial agreement was
invalid when the wife, not represented by counsel, signed the agreement a day before the parties'
departure for their wedding trip); Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W. Va. 1985) (stating
"independent advice is not a prerequisite to enforceability when the terms of an agreement are
understandable to a reasonably intelligent adult, as long as both parties had the opportunity to
consult with independent legal counsel").
242. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801-02. The comment to section 6 of the UPAA states
the absence of legal counsel is a factor in determining whether to enforce a prenuptial agreement.
See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 376 (1997). The court noted a
previous draft of the UPAA made legal counsel a requirement, but this was ultimately omitted
because the drafters believed that the rights of people should not depend upon whether they have
lawyers. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.
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practice guides on family law, warned attorneys it may be unethical for one
attorney to represent two parties with conflicting interests.243
For these reasons, the court required heightened scrutiny in situations
where one party signing the prenuptial agreement has legal representation,
while the other party both waives his or her statutory rights without having
consulted separate legal counsel and does not possess legal skills or
business acumen.244 Because Sun did not have independent legal counsel
prior to executing the contract, the appellate court held the trial court
should have applied heightened scrutiny to the voluntariness analysis of the
Bonds agreement. 245  As a result, the court reversed the trial court's
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the
newly created standard.24
C. Current Status of the Bonds' Case
After the appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court's
decision, Barry Bonds appealed the case to the California Supreme
Court.247 The California Supreme Court granted review of the case on July
21, 1999.248
V. THE MISTAKES OF THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL
A. Choice-of-Law Clause
Although the choice-of-law clause in the Bonds' prenuptial agreement
was incomplete and ambiguous, 249 the appellate court should have used
243. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803-04. The court noted that California's practice
guides have alerted practitioners for many years about the danger of a reviewing court refusing to
enforce an agreement where: only one party is represented; where there was no signature by that
unrepresented party; the parties did not understand the potential conflict of interest; or there was
no written recommendation for that party to seek independent legal counsel. See id. The
American Law Institute ("ALI")-American Bar Association Continuing Legal Education practice
guide advises if one party has an attorney and that attorney does not insist on the other party
having independent legal counsel, the attorney is probably committing malpractice. See id. at 804
n.8. The ALl recommends, in order to help ensure the chances of the agreement being upheld,
attorneys should refuse to represent parties on opposite sides of a prenuptial agreement. See id.
244. See id. at 797.
245. See id. at 809.
246. See id. at 815.
247. See Bonds v. Bonds (In re Marriage of Bonds), 981 P.2d 40, 40 (Cal. 1999).
248. See id.
249. See Bonds v. Bonds (In re Marriage of Bonds), 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 791 (Ct. App.
1999). The choice-of-law clause failed to specify the applicable state law. See id.
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contract interpretation rules to construct the meaning of the clause.
California law requires courts interpret a prenuptial agreement so as to give
effect to the two parties' mutual intent.2 50 The court is also permitted to use
extrinsic evidence to help interpret ambiguous terms.25'
Sun testified the attorneys informed the couple that Arizona law
252would apply to their agreement. It is a logical inference that this was
Barry's intention because Arizona was the state in which the prenuptial
agreement was signed and the state in which Barry and Sun resided.253 The
record also reflects no significant contacts with any other state at the time
in which the agreement was executed. 54 Thus, if that was in fact Barry's
intention, it is highly unlikely his attorneys would draft the prenuptial
agreement in a manner contrary to that intention. Furthermore, it is
reasonable to infer Sun also intended for Arizona law to apply because
nothing in the record indicates she objected when Barry's attorneys
allegedly stated Arizona law would apply. 55
Even if the attorneys did not tell Sun and Barry that Arizona law
would apply, however, California law dictates ambiguous choice-of-law
clauses be interpreted against the drafter of the contract where contract
interpretation rules fail to clarify the clause.256 Because Sun desired
Arizona law to apply2 57 and Barry was responsible for the drafting of the
agreement, the court should have interpreted this ambiguous clause against
258Barry by applying Sun's choice of law, Arizona.
In determining whether the trial court's choice of law was correct, the
appellate court improperly disregarded the agreement's choice-of-law
clause by basing its decision on section 1612(a)(6) of California's UPAA
and the section's legislative history.2 59 This section provides parties to a
prenuptial agreement can contract as to choice of law concerning the
construction of the agreement.2 60  As the court noted, the section's
legislative history distinguishes contract construction from contract
250. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1636 (West 1985).
251. See Powers v. Dickson, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 266 (Ct. App. 1997).
252. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791.
253. See id. at 787-89.
254. See id.
255. See id. at 791.
256. See Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266-67 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1654 (West
1985)).
257. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
258. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
259. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791-92.
260. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(a)(6) (West 1994).
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enforcement and/or validity.26' The court reasoned because section
1612(a)(6) only permitted choice-of-law clauses regarding the construction
of an agreement and because this case dealt with the validity of the
agreement, the parties could not use a choice-of-law clause to resolve this
issue. 262 Instead, the court should have referred to section 1612(a)(7) of the
UPAA, allowing parties to a prenuptial agreement to freely contract as to
any matter, as long as the provisions do not violate public policy or
criminal statutes. 263 By making the two sections contiguous, the drafters
probably intended the sections to be complimentary.
The court appropriately disregarded the Bonds' choice-of-law clause.
However, it failed to employ the correct rationale for doing so. As
discussed previously, the court should have used contract interpretation
rules to find the parties intended Arizona law to apply to this case. Once
this determination was made, the court should have recognized applying
the relevant pre-UPAA Arizona law would undermine the UPAA's
uniformity goal264 as Arizona law required a more stringent standard of
enforceability. 265  Given that the Bonds were California residents at the
time of the appellate court decision266 and California adopted the UPAA
and its uniformity goals, the correct determination was to disregard the
choice of Arizona's pre-UPAA law. Nonetheless, the court's reliance on
section 1612(a)(6) of the UPAA to justify its determination was an error.
As a result, the choice-of-law clause was correctly invalidated, but for the
wrong reasons.
After invalidating the choice-of-law clause in the Bonds' prenuptial
agreement, the court had to decide whether California or Arizona law
should apply in determining the agreement's validity. First, the court
should have analyzed whether Arizona had an actual interest in applying its
law.267 This would allow the court to ascertain whether there was a true
conflict between California and Arizona law, thus warranting comparative
impairment analysis.268
261. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791.
262. See id. at 791-92.
263. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(a)(7) (West 1994).
264. The intent to promote enforceability and uniformity is found within the actual UPAA
passed by the National Conference of Commissioners on State Laws and Proceedings. See UNIF.
PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
265. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
266. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
267. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719,721-23 (Cal. 1976).
268. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
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Arizona's pre-UPAA law articulated an interest in protecting its
divorced spouses.269 After adopting the UPAA law, however, Arizona's
focus has changed from protecting the challenger of a prenuptial agreement
to promoting the enforceability of prenuptial agreements.70
On the other hand, California has a strong interest in applying the
UPAA and its goals of enforceability and uniform treatment of prenuptial
agreements. 271  The law seeks to accomplish these goals by placing the
burden of proof on the challenger of the agreement, requiring the party with
the burden of proof to show that the agreement was either entered into
involuntarily or was unconscionable at the time of execution and executed
without full disclosure of the parties' assets. 72 Further, California has a
specific interest in the Bonds' case because it address the very meaning of
voluntariness for purposes of the UPAA, a concept that has not been
flushed out by case law thus far. 73
California's interest in applying its given laws also stems from its
territorial contacts with the parties.274 The parties currently reside in
California, the lawsuit was brought in California, and Barry plays for the
San Francisco Giants, a California baseball team.
2175
At first glance, Arizona appears to have an interest in protecting
destitute spouses by application of its laws. However, the state's
subsequent UPAA passage eliminates this interest. Thus, Arizona has no
interest in applying its preempted law. Conversly, California has multiple
interests in applying its UPAA laws. First, the uniformity objective
underlying the UPAA is jeopardized. Second, the parties were California
residents. Finally, the case would help clarify what constitutes
269. See Hess v. Hess (In re Marriage of Hess), No. 1 CA-CV 91-0233, 1 CA-CV 92-0185,
1993 Ariz. App. LEXIS 244, at *18 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1993) (noting Arizona sought to
protect the destitute spouse). Arizona accomplished its interest by placing the burden of proof on
the person arguing for the validity of the agreement. See id. at *13-14, *18, *21. Arizona
required the party with the burden to show, by clear and convincing evidence, the agreement was
fair, reasonable and not an adhesion contract. Id.
270. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has
Been Adopted, 9B U.L.A. 83 (Supp. 1999).
271. See UNiF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 369.
272. See CAL. FAM CODE § 1615 (West 1994).
273. See Comparative Impairment Reformed: Rethinking State Interests in the Conflict of
Laws, 95 HARV. L. REV 1079, 1098 (1982) (noting the closer a case resembles a "core"
application of a statute, the greater the state's interest in its application).
274. See id. at 1099 (stating the extent of the parties' territorial contacts is another factor in
policy analysis).
275. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789; see also Sosa's New Deal: $42.5 Million, S.F.
CHRON., June 28, 1997, at B5.
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voluntariness for purposes of the state's UPAA law. Therefore, the court
was therefore correct to apply California law.
In sum, the choice-of-law clause in the Bonds' agreement was
invalidated for the wrong reasons. Although the clause failed to delineate
which state's laws would apply, the court of appeal should have used
contract interpretation rules to determine the clause's intent was to select
Arizona law. The court should then have found the clause invalid because
Arizona law was inconsistent with California's public policy interest in the
uniform treatment and enforceability of prenuptial agreements instead of
finding the clause was invalid because California law prohibits choice-of-
law clauses in prenuptial agreements. The court's subsequent analysis was
correct. Arizona had no real interest in applying its old law. Thus, the
court properly applied California law.
B. Validity of the Prenuptial Agreement
1. Unconscionability and Failure to Disclose Assets
In its validity analysis, the California Court of Appeal quickly and
properly dealt with the California UPAA provisions regarding
unconscionability and failure to disclose all assets.276  These sections
provide even where a prenuptial agreement is unconscionable, it will
nonetheless be enforced unless the non-drafting party failed to provide "fair
and reasonable disclosure of [that party's] property and financial
obligations" 277 to the other party. 278 The record reflects even though an
actual schedule of Barry's and Sun's assets was not attached to the
agreement, both parties knew of'each other's assets and had access to a
handwritten list at the attorney's office on the date of execution.279 As a
result, the court properly concluded Barry fairly and reasonably disclosed
all property and financial obligations to Sun. 80
2. Voluntariness
The appellate court's greatest weakness lies in its holding regarding
voluntariness. By creating a new heightened scrutiny rule for agreements
executed without both parties having independent legal counsel, the
276. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798; CAL. FAm. CODE § 1615(a)(2)(A) (West 1994).
277. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(a)(2) (West 1994).
278. See id.
279. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 798.
280. See id.
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appellate court exceeded its authority. Further, the court remanded the case
to the trial court without instructions as to how to apply the rule to the
Bonds.28' In avoiding this controversial issue to the trial court, the court
may have left itself open to much less criticism, but it increased the
likelihood of future inconsistent application of California's UPAA laws.
a. Failure to Abide by the Language and Legislative History of the Law
The California Court of Appeal erred in creating a new heightened
standard because the standard directly contradicts the language of the
UPAA.282 California's UPAA requires only that a prenuptial agreement be
signed voluntarily and it fairly and reasonably disclose the other party's
283assets. No requirement exists that if one party has counsel, the other
must retain counsel as well.28 Moreover, the language of the statute itself
does not in any way allude to the use of heightened scrutiny in the absence
of independent legal counsel for both parties.
285
The court's error may partly lie in its misinterpretation of the intent
underlying California's UPAA. The court cited legislative history
discussing mandatory independent legal counsel for both parties, but the
UPAA drafters ultimately refused to make such a requirement because they
felt the rights of parties to an agreement should not be dependent upon
whether they retained attorneys.286 However, by imposing a heightened
scrutiny standard on the voluntariness analysis, the court effectively did
what the drafters refused to do. It made the validity of a prenuptial
agreement heavily dependent on whether both parties had independent
legal counsel. The court subordinated the clear intent of the UPAA by
making independent legal counsel a nearly de facto requirement instead of
considering it a voluntariness factor.
287
The appellate court's decision contradicts the will of the legislature
and violates California Code of Civil Procedure section 1858.288 That
section provides in construing a statute, the duty of the court is "simply to
281. See id. at 812.
282. Prior to this case, heightened scrutiny was not required simply because one party was
represented by independent legal counsel. See id. at 816, 819 (Ruvolo, J., concurring and
dissenting). Previously, whether both parties had independent counsel was just one factor in
determining whether the agreement was signed voluntarily. Id.
283. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(a)(l)-(a)(2)(A) (West 1994).
284. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1600-1617 (West 1994).
285. See id. § 1615.
286. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 802.
287. See id. at 819 (Ruvolo, J., concurring and dissenting).
288. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1858 (West 1983).
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ascertain and declare what is in terms or substance contained therein, not to
insert what has been omitted., 289  The court's decision goes beyond the
scope of the judiciary's power by legislating instead of merely
interpreting.
290
b. Subversion of the Goals of the UPAA
The court's new standard also undermines the UPAA's uniformity
and certainty goals by failing to clearly articulate the contours of the new
standard.29' While the court states its holding four times, it characterizes
the holding differently each time.292 This creates uncertainty as to what
exactly is required to ensure a prenuptial agreement is upheld.
Furthermore, by failing to apply the new standard, the appellate court
relinquished the opportunity to define what facts would satisfy the
standard. If the court does not clearly articulate its own holding, lower
courts will apply the new standard inconsistently. The combination of poor
articulation and few guidelines inserts subjectivity into the new heightened
scrutiny standard. Further, it will likely reintroduce the lack of uniformity
in applying prenuptial agreement law the UPAA sought to eliminate.
Because the ambiguous standard adds another layer of factual scrutiny to
the law, the court makes possible the very scenario the UPAA was intended
289. Id.
290. See People v. Rudy L. (In re Rudy L.), 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 866 (Ct. App. 1994).
291. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787, 797, 800, 809. See UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 369, for a discussion of the goals of the UPAA.
292. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787, 797, 800, 809. The court first said the standard
should apply "when a party challenging a premarital agreement establishes that he or she did not
have legal counsel while the other party had such assistance, and the unrepresented party did not
have the opportunity to obtain legal counsel or did not knowingly refuse legal counsel .... Id.
at 787. The court then phrased the holding as "we conclude that courts must more carefully
scrutinize the process when the bargaining relationship is so unequal that only one party has legal
representation and the party without legal representation does not have any particular legal skills
or business acumen and agrees to forgo his or her statutory rights." Id. at 797. The court next
characterized the standard as "[c]losely scrutinizing the circumstances surrounding the execution
of the contract when only one party has legal counsel .. " Id. at 800. Thereafter, the court
stated "[a]s with settlement agreements in divorce actions, the court should 'carefully scrutinize
the [prenuptial] agreements when the party challenging the agreement did not have the advice of
counsel." Id. at 809 (quoting Adams v. Adams, 177 P.2d 265, 269 (Cal. 1947)). At one juncture,
the court discussed both parties having the opportunity to have counsel or fnot knowingly refuse
legal counsel; at another, it only discusses the unrepresented party's opportunity. See Bonds, 83
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787, 797, 800, 809. Similarly, the court does not clearly state whether it is
important for the other party to have counsel even if the drafter does not. Id. Furthermore, the
court does not sufficiently explain whether the possession of legal and business sophistication
should be a factor in every case. Id. The same holds true for the requirement of knowingly
refusing counsel. Id.
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to remedy, "reflexive response[s] to varying factual circumstances at
different times. 293
Moreover, the standard delineated by the court contradicts the UPAA
in yet another way. The UPAA standardized the treatment of prenuptial
agreements by "emphasizing the freedom of contract [concept] over
protection of the economically un-empowered spouse. 294 By emphasizing
the need for independent legal counsel, the court undermines the UPAA's
policy of freedom to contract.
c. Poor Use of Case Law as Justification
The court supported its new standard with a limited number of cases:
In re Marriage of Foran,295 Fletcher v. Fletcher296 and Gant v. Gant.297
However, these cases were decided in non-UPAA jurisdictions.
298
Consequently, these cases have little relevance to the UPAA-guided
analysis applicable to Bonds.
Although the court was also guided by UPAA case law, it utilized
only one case in support of its decision, 299 In re Estate of Lutz. 3°° In Lutz, a
North Dakota Supreme Court ruled "lack of adequate legal advice to a
prospective spouse to obtain independent counsel is a significant factual
factor in weighing the voluntariness of a premarital agreement., 30 1 The
Lutz court correctly found independent legal counsel is a factor courts
should consider as part of the voluntariness determination. 30 2 However,
Lutz does not stand for the idea that heightened scrutiny should apply
where a party lacks independent legal counsel.30 3 In addition, the Bonds
court explicitly changed the Lutz court's characterization of the
293. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 369.
294. Brandt, supra note 61, at 543.
295. Foran v. Foran (In re Marriage of Foran), 834 P.2d 1081 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
296. 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994).
297. 329 S.E.2d 106 (W. Va. 1985).
298. Foran, Fletcher, and Gant involved respectively Washington, Ohio, and West
Virginia. See Foran, 834 P.2d 1081; Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343; Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106. None of
these states has passed the UPAA. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, Table of
Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 9B U.L.A. 83.
299. See Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 819 n.7 (Ruvolo, J., concurring and dissenting).
300. Lutz v. Schneider (In re Estate of Lutz), 563 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1997).
301. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 98.
302. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
303. See Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 98-99. The Lutz court stated directly before its holding that
"lack of opportunity to consult with independent counsel may be a factor in a fiduciary
relationship." Id. at 98. This suggests the court did not desire to give legal counsel as much
weight as the court in Bonds.
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independent legal counsel factor from "significant," 3°4 to "especially
significant. 30 5  In sum, the California Court of Appeal stretched the
language in Lutz beyond its reasonable interpretation in order to support its
imposition of a heightened scrutiny standard.
d. The Bonds Court Improperly Usurped the Legislature's Powers
The Bonds court extensively discussed the policies favoring use of
strict scrutiny: the lack of economic parity between men and women,
women's tendency to have greater responsibilities at home and women's
proclivity to be the disadvantaged party in prenuptial agreements.
30 6
Society should address these legitimate concerns.30 7 However, it is
inappropriate for a court to question the wisdom of the legislature.3 8 The
legislature's duty is to weigh public policy and enact laws to ameliorate
societal problems. 30 9  By contrast, the judiciary primarily interprets the
law. 310  Thus, the Bonds court's creation of a standard absent from the
California UPAA usurps the legislature's delegated power and thereby
subverts the will of the people.31'
In conclusion, the new standard of voluntariness review of prenuptial
agreements fails to abide by the language and legislative history of the
California UPAA. 312 The California Court of Appeal undermines the
explicit goals of the UPAA by creating this new standard.313 Further, the
court over-reaches its power by usurping the role of the legislature.31 4 As a
304. Lutz, 563 N.W.2d at 98.
305. Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800.
306. See id. at 795.
307. See generally Barbara Ann Atwood, Ten Years Later: Lingering Concerns about the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 19 J. LEGIS. 127 (1993).
308. See Exparte West, 243 P. 55, 59 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925).
309. See id.
310. See C. Christine Fahrenback, Note, Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer: A
Change in Course: COGSA Does Not Invalidate Foreign Arbitration Clauses in Maritime, 29
AKRON L. REV. 371, 389 (1996).
311. As Alexander M. Bickel wrote:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
system. There are various ways of sliding over this ineluctable reality...
obscuring the reality that when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a
legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of the
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it... it is the reason the charge can be
made that judicial review is undemocratic.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986).
312. See supra Part V.B.2.a.
313. See supra Part V.B.2.b.
314. See supra Part V.B.2.d.
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result, the California Court of Appeal's decision in In re Marriage of Bonds
is flawed and should be overturned.
VI. PROPOSAL
As discussed above, the California Court of Appeal's decision in
Bonds is flawed. 315 However, desiring all parties involved in prenuptial
agreements to have independent legal counsel was not one of them. Rather
than judicially amending the California UPAA's application, the court
should have restricted itself to suggesting the legislature amend the law to
make independent legal counsel a requirement.
Requiring independent legal counsel for both parties to a prenuptial
agreement has been advocated in the past.316 One rationale for requiring
independent counsel is without it, a party might not consider the possibility
of circumstances changing during the marriage and the effects a prenuptial
agreement could have on these changes.317 This is especially true for
spouses of athletes, who may not envision their athlete spouses spending so
much time away from them, and leaving them with the sole responsibility
of caring for children and the home. These spouses might change their
opinion about whether they should waive their statutory community
property rights with a prenuptial agreement in light of these possibilities.
In addition, people in love are not as likely to be as objective and
critical as they would be otherwise. 318 The premarital context can cloud a
person's ability to fully understand the ramifications of waiving his or her
statutory rights.319
In light of these problems, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform Laws should amend the UPAA to require independent legal
counsel for both parties. The amendment should provide if the non-
drafting party cannot afford an attorney, the party proposing the agreement
should pay for the services. If a party has assets valuable enough to inspire
the drafting of a prenuptial agreement, then that party can likely afford to
pay for the other party's counsel. It also serves the interests of the
wealthier party to pay for good counsel because it helps ensure the party
signing the agreement does so knowingly, thereby strengthening the
validity of the agreement.
315. See supra Part V.
316. See Marston, supra note 9, at 913.
317. See id. at 914.
318. See id. at 911.
319. See id. at 913.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Prenuptial agreements have taken on many of the very same
characteristics that other contracts generally possess because of the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act's passage. The UPAA's increased
certainty of enforceability of prenuptial agreements has made them more
attractive to athletes like Barry Bonds. However, that attraction will be
short lived if the California Supreme Court does not reverse the California
Court of Appeal's misguided decision in the Barry Bonds case.
First, the California Supreme Court must recognize the appellate court
erred in not interpreting the Bonds' choice-of-law clause, a particularly
important provision in athletes' contracts. The appellate court discounted
the clause as invalid because it dealt with the enforceability of a prenuptial
agreement. However, the clause should have been disregarded for another
reason, Arizona's pre-UPAA laws, which the parties likely intended to
apply, violate important California public policies. The court correctly
ruled Arizona had no interest in applying its revoked common law to this
case. Thus, the court correctly applied California law to the case.
Second, although the court made numerous mistakes, the most
egregious error was the imposition of heightened scrutiny to the prenuptial
agreement analysis where only one party had independent legal counsel
prior to execution and the other party did not have sufficient business or
legal skills. The court created this new standard even though it contradicts
the UPAA, conflicts with the UPAA's legislative history and applicable
case law, and subverts the UPAA's goals. In sum, the court usurped the
powers of the legislature by creating a new heightened standard. As one
critic put it, the court came to its own conclusion and then shaped the law
accordingly.32
Nevertheless, the appellate court in Bonds tried to achieve a
legitimate goal of requiring independent legal counsel for both parties
entering into prenuptial agreements. The court wisely recognized parties
blinded by love are often unable to foresee the ultimate ramifications of the
agreement should circumstances change, as they often do in the marriages
of traveling professional athletes.
Nonetheless, instead of engaging in judicial legislation, the California
Court of Appeal should have limited itself to strongly suggesting that the
legislature amend the UPAA. Because it did not so limit itself, the
320. See Harry J. Gruener, Barry Bonds Strikes Out in California-Big Time, LAW. J., July
2, 1999, at 7 (1999).
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California Supreme Court should overturn the appellate court's decision
and bring certainty and enforceability back to prenuptial agreements so
professional athletes can once again rely on them to protect their assets.
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